Leniency programs stand for a rather easy collection of evidence and intelligence. Added value is achieved by hindering upcoming and maintaining cartels to develop an organizational structure. Leniency also increases uncertainty on the side of the cartel members and makes it more difficult for cartel participants to reach an agreement. Furthermore, the costs of adjudicating are decreased by the legal goal-oriented activity of whistle blowers. Therefore, the leniency programs of the EU and of the most member states proved to be a success story on the one hand. In contrary, there are a few adverse effects. In a theoretical approach, the notion of leniency is contradictory since blowing the whistle is the second best choice only. To make the exemption to become the rule gives wrong incentives to the market members to opt for the first best choice in order to build a cartel either not punished or not discovered and keep silent. For quite some principle reasoning such view would create an obstacle. Moreover practically, some adverse effects have been discussed. For my part, the most crucial notion is that leniency programs are thought to help to find out well hidden cartels, in other words to encourage discovery in hard cases. Instead, leniency is not eligible to be the main tool of lazy cartel enforcement. For regular investigation, there are other incentives in the law of discovery, in procedural law, and last but not least in private enforcement due to the action provided by the legal order of member states. However, I would not hesitate to vote for its limited supplementary use in cartel matters.
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I. Introduction and case
Leniency appears to be a cornerstone of the enforcement policy of the European Commission and the National Competition Authorities. Allegedly, around 60 % of cartel infringements are discovered through leniency. The Commission claims that its efficiency and effectiveness could hardly be overestimated. In relation to Brazil, the subject matter appears of specific interest not only because there is a leniency program in Brazilian cartel law as well.
1 Moreover, the European and Brazilian leniency program differ systematically in respect of the subsequent cartel law enforcement which relies on fines in the EU while Brazil counts criminal law punishment. 2 Indeed, in many cases, the leniency program of the EU and on a national level in the meanwhile of about 28 member states became a success story. To introduce to advantages and problems of the EU leniency system developed by administrative practice, the Air Cargo Cases might appear interesting.
3 High fines were imposed on major European airlines for taking specific common fees on airport security, fuel and other purposes out of the competitive process of price calculation without forwarding the advantages to other market participants. From their point of view, however, it made sense not to compete in price segments which were introduced on them by airport and/or public authorities. Nevertheless, their behavior was regarded to be a cartel caught by Art. 101 para I of the Treaty. Since Lufthansa and Swiss happened to blow the whistle they did not face any fines while others had to pay end to their participation and co-operate in the Commission's investigation, independently of the rest of the undertakings involved in the cartel. In official EU reasoning about its tool, the interests of consumers and citizens in ensuring that secret cartels are detected and punished outweigh the interest in fining those undertakings that enable the Commission to detect and prohibit such practices. For this reason, companies participating in illegal cartels do have a limited opportunity to avoid or reduce a fine by the leniency policy of the Commission. In brief, companies that provide information about a cartel in which they participated might receive full or partial immunity from fines. The EU leniency program provides two levels of relief for the whistle blower by either full or partial immunity. In order to obtain full immunity, an undertaking must be the first one to inform the authorities by providing sufficient information to allow to launch an inspection at the premises of the companies allegedly involved. If the authority is already in possession of sufficient information to launch an inspection or has already undertaken one, the whistle blower must provide evidence that enables the Commission to prove the cartel infringement. In any case, the undertaking must fully cooperate with the EU, provide the inspectors with all evidence in its possession and put an end to the infringement immediately. The benefits are not applicable, however, as the whistle blower took steps to coerce other undertakings to participate in the cartel. In detail, the information disclosed must enable the authority either to carry out a targeted inspection 6 or to find 6 "The assessment of the threshold will have to be carried out ex ante, i.e. without taking into account whether a given inspection has or has not been successful or whether or not an inspection has or has not been carried out. The assessment will be made exclusively on the basis of the type and the quality of the information submitted by the applicant." Art. 9 In terms of procedure, the undertaking has to furnish a formal application to the Commission and it must present it with sufficient evidence. The first company to meet these conditions is granted 30 to 50% reduction, the second 20 to 30% and subsequent companies up to 20%.
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Further rules on both procedure taking place at the EU Commission Directorate General for Competition are to be applied.
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Some general reasoning on the success of leniency programs
Acclamation
According to the EU Commission, secret cartels are otherwise difficult to detect. Thus, leniency programs are allowing the authority not Furthermore, the leniency policy has a deterrent effect on cartel formation and it destabilizes the operation of existing cartels as it seeds distrust and suspicion among cartel members. The interests of consumers and citizens in ensuring that secret cartels are detected and punished outweigh the interest in fining those undertakings that enable the Commission to detect and prohibit such practices. The Commission considers that the collaboration of an undertaking in the detection of the existence of a cartel has an intrinsic value. A decisive contribution to the opening of an investigation or to the finding of an infringement may justify the granting of immunity from any fine to the undertaking in question, on condition that certain additional requirements are fulfilled. Thus, leniency programs stand for a rather easy collection of evidence and intelligence.
14 Added value is achieved by hindering upcoming and maintaining cartels to develop an organizational structure. Leniency also increases uncertainty on the side of the cartel members and makes it more difficult for cartel participants to reach an agreement. Furthermore, the costs of adjudicating are decreased by the legal goal-oriented activity of whistle blowers. 15 Moreover, a promising view is offered by OECD after investigating leniency programs, for an effective leniency program, a high degree of predictability, transparency and certainty appears necessary, together with a low burden of proof, heavy penalties and an emphasis on priority. 16 Compared to the remaining other possibilities in obtaining information for cartel enforcement, which are direct force and compulsion, whistle-blowing as the third option has clear advantages in respect of collecting intelligence and evidence. 17 Thus, together with the other advantages mentioned as there are lower costs of adjudication on the side of the authority and increased difficulties of creating and maintaining cartels, it does not astonish that leniency programs in cartel law mushroom all over the world and regardless of the system of cartel enforcement installed. objective method of market analysis based on economic issues without applying faultsubstituting criteria. On the first glance, it appears convincing that there are the above mentioned three modes of cartel enforcement. Seen more thoroughly, though, the objective analysis of markets should not be underestimated as it seems to be the more sophisticated tool.
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On the contrary, though, one may argue that quite some cases are not capable for applying objective criteria. Furthermore, a sound proof by 19 The critique concern modes of behavior of the cartel authority. witness appears more convincing than economic theories of market behaviour. While the latter counterargument is rather doubtful, the first constitutes a problem of the objective method. Consequently, there was some need to fill the gap by leniency programs in order to have more success in cartel investigation. This reasoning demonstrates, however, that leniency programs are good to compensate deficiencies of objective market analysis. They have not been thought to be the main instrument of cartel investigation. One should not become victim of his own success. Moreover, the notion of future development of markets as it is inherent to all cartel rules appears to be economic law where the logic of a policemen might not always be appropriate. This is the first issue for general reflection on the usefulness of leniency programs.
The prisoner's dilemma utilized
Another, more academic issue is to employ economic analysis. Leniency may appear to be applied game theory, where the prisoner's dilemma is intended to describe decisions. 20 The illustration goes that two prisoners were arrested for a crime and interrogated separately. If both remain silent each will be 20 The suggestion of making use of game theory in order to analyze cartel leniency programs has been developed long ago. "The basic intuition being that leniency policy places the cartel firms in a prisoners dilemma. This is not the case, every firm in the cartel is actually better off if no one runs to the courthouse, including the firm that runs. convicted of a relatively minor offence, and spend a year in prison. If both confess, each will receive five years for being cooperative, although envisaging a much more serious offence. If only one fully confesses but the other remains silent, the confessor will go free on leniency, whilst the other, noncooperative will receive a tenyear sentence. Obviously, both actions are interrelated by our small social model of non-equivalent values.
Pay-off table:
(Version first prisoner) Second prisoner remains silent confesses
First prisoner
Assume the prisoners will decide rationally, so each may try to achieve his first preference. It is useful to set out the preference-ordering of the first prisoner and the consequence for the second prisoner of each of the former's preferences: It is not rational to remain silent whilst the other prisoner confesses, so the likely outcome is that each will confess, with the consequence that each satisfies only his third preference. What makes the decision interesting is that each could do better by agreeing to remain silent. Furthermore, a gain for one prisoner does not result in an equivalent loss for the other. In cartel matters, the explanation of how, through cooperation with other cartel members, each member might move from his third to his second preference is another description of the contractual nature of cartels. The third preference represents the non-cooperative characteristic, the agreement to remain silent is -againequivalent to the contract as such, and the satisfaction of the second preference equates to make concessions. In social theory, these are the advantages and burdens in submitting to the state as such, here the model is misused to demonstrate the rational of the "mafia-state". However, only the one-side cooperation with the authority of the leniency program gives full advantage to prisoner 1 and most disadvantage to prisoner 2. At the same time, it reflects the limits and a few of the problems of blowing the whistle as soon as other cartel members are likely to prefer the same behavior, represented by choice 3. And again, the most rational decision of our cartel members is the choice of staying silent, to cooperate with each other, means, not to cooperate with the cartel offices. In conclusion, though, one must concede that the logics of leniency programs appear pretty much obscure. However, this model demonstrates the inner con-tradiction of leniency programs being a success story on its surface only.
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In order to neutralize at least against some of these effects, the EU has introduced a marker system. A marker must contain the type and duration of infringement, the product and geographic markets affected, the identity of the involved persons or undertakings, and must disclose applications with other competition authorities. Although, it is doubtful whether the EU marker system may compensate negative effects of the leniency procedure since the Commission exercises a high degree of administrative discretion in exercising the system. Thus, the marker system has been criticised for the excessively detailed information required and for its free discretion used in respect of detailed evidence requirements which 21 verbally or in writing and in the language of an EU member state or in English. A marker can even be noted as late as during an on-going inspection. On a national level, many agencies use marker systems in their leniency programs since markers have even more advantages. 24 They provide the applicants for immunity or fine reduction at least some time to gather information. As long as a person holds the marker for a particular cartel infringement, no other person involved in the same behaviour will be allowed to require the marked place in queue even if the other could satisfy the demand of the authority on the spot. For these and other reasons, the marker system is one of the connection lines between theory and practical relevance, although, its reality in administrative practice has been challenged. 25 24 Ibid., European Competition Network, Art. 51. 25 Critical remarks on the marker system will be discussed in chapter IV. 3. c)
IV. Debate on leniency programmes
Due to the growing number of leniency programs on the one hand and leniency applications on the other, the system is increasingly criticised, and seems to suffer from certain issues that might function as disincentives to blow the whistle.
Institutional problems in relation to member states: insufficient harmonization
A mentioned above, the current leniency system -which dates back from 2006 -was not framed to attract a large amount of leniency applicants. While leniency should in fact speed up the decision making process of the competition authorities, the latter are now facing a major backlog of leniency applications. sion, the missing one-stop shop for undertakings appears to be a common obstacle of leniency programs which, however, could be resolved by unification or at least by more harmonization and reduction of quantity. Therefore, the human rights of Art. 6 will apply to leniency programs varying the sanctions imposed by the authority. Even without the assumption of a criminal nature, it would be possible to apply Art. 6 ECHR and the principles connected thereto, including the EU Charter, for a full judicial review since there is no area in European law free of fundamental rights.
Rule of law and basic principles
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(1) Consequently, for leniency programs as a part of EU competition procedure, by applying Art. 6 ECHR the right to a fair trial has to be envisaged. 31 lege of non-incrimination, the right of defence including the right to have access to the file of the Commission, the right to be heard, the right to a lawyer, and the right of summon witness have to be taken into account. As far as the judicial control by the European Courts in respects of action of the EU Commission as European cartel authority is given, there should be not too many problems with these principles. 32 The same counts for the competence of the cartel authorities of the member states. Maybe, this view deems superficially. Anyway, this perspective demonstrates that the source of the human right issue is much more virulent than one might expect in a core field of European market law. Its relevance, though, unsurprisingly covers the complete field of competition law enforcement, thereby not being limited to the leniency aspect.
(2) As mentioned before, the ne bis in idem principle appears of specific relevance to leni-ency programs. It may be derived from jurisdiction based on the ECHR or by the summary of rule of law principles as the common essence of legal principle of the EU Member States. The cases on airfreight demonstrate the problem sufficiently. Lufthansa might be well off concerning the application of the EU leniency program and granting full immunity. It will for its very same behaviour, however, face sanctions in other parts of the world. Disclosing information in the frame of the EU leniency program could in the extreme cause even more sanctions in other parts of the world. Despite some activities on side of the EU in resolving the situation, this problem still prevails inside Europe and even more in taking a global view 33 .
(3) Other human right issues as the right to privacy derived from Art. 8 ECHR could be employed by facing the massive tools which the EU and its inspectors actually have. This point again faces European cartel prosecution as such and is not typical for leniency programs.
(4) More procedural principles derived from the rule of law are procedural fairness and legal certainty which may be touched by the EU leniency program, due to its experimental nature of trial and error. 34 In contrary, there are also arguments pro whistleblowing to be excerpted from general principles. Most interestingly, take Art. 10 ECHR, where a whistleblower is protected by freedom of opinion. The European Court of Human Rights found the termination of employment contracts in rewarding of whistle-blowing to be void. 35 In summary, procedural principles might be seriously concerned by the EU leniency program whilst the danger of 34 Carmeliet (Fn. 15) violation of human rights according to 6 and Art. 8 ECHR has to be envisaged, although not being likely. Even to the contrary, human rights might protect whistleblowers at least for specific groups of cases. c) Others argue, much more far-reaching, that there should a system of criminal sanctions in cartel matters, maybe similar to the US. From a European point of view, one tends to oppose such a view, nevertheless, since the criminal law approach should be deemed to have a better conclusiveness. As pointed out before, a mere criminal law view on the cartel enforcement system would contradict any broad application of the leniency programs. 36 More specifically, it is argued, first, that the cur- : An economically acting player could outweigh the cost of being caught against the advantages of undesired behaviour, small probability of being caught and the possibility of achieving immunity under one of the leniency programs. b) Even outside much calculation, there remains a moral hazard problem caused by the notion that in some cases prohibited behaviour remains free of sanctions. Leniency programs may deter collusion. Some authors believe in the impact of reduced fines and positive rewards and argue that rewarding individuals, including firm employees, can deter collusion in a more effective way to the result that reward programs could heal adverse effects by providing additional incentives. 42 In this respect, har-monisation and clear rules would be helpful.
c) The marker system was introduced by the Commission to increase rationality of the leniency regime. 43 Indeed, most cartel authorities use markers. They are a countermeasure against some sideeffects of the leniency system by granting to the applicants a limited period of time in order to demonstrate that they satisfy the requirements for immunity. As long as an applicant holds the marker no other person involved in the same cartel will be capable of taking the place in the "immunity queue". Nevertheless, the marker system is criticized because it has been made responsible for adverse effects by bringing a high degree of administrative discretion, uncertainty and unpredictability into the leniency process. d) Inter-relation of the cartelists -adverse "private enforcement" Since leniency clauses are offering cartelists legal immunity if they blow the whistle on each other, there is misuse not unlikely. While the authorities wish to thwart cartels and promote competition, this effect is not evident, however, because whistleblowing may enforce trust and collusion by providing a tool 45 for cartelists to punish each other. 46 This broad statement might overdue it, although, there is a true core of adverse effects which cannot be eliminated.
(1) Procedural laws are not harmonized, to the effect that divergences could be misused by insiders to cause adverse effects.
(2) The granting of immunity from penalties or the reduction of penalties for antitrust violations in exchange for cooperation with the antitrust enforcement authorities has beside its positive effects also negative outcome on optimal antitrust enforcement, and the extent to which these effects can be measured. 53 If a personal remark is allowed, I guess that one of the troubles of European law and its procedure is caused by a dominating public or constitutional legal thinking. One should not forget that market law or economic law deals with the interrelationship of private parties which is the traditional core sphere of private law and its procedure. b) Therefore on the contrary, the value of administrative action appears a kind of 53 Ibid. overestimated, while private action in cartel matters seems to be almost hidden. At least in criminal law, leniency programs are a rather problematic and debated matter. They should not be used to change the character of economic law to become administrative or even criminal prosecution. Anyway, private action under national law caused on violation of EU or national cartel law is on the rise. 54 Private action should be more encouraged what is possible by using a few minor incentives. In view of the success of leniency programs, private action has be seen by some authors as a disturbing, almost irrational element. I would take the opposite position in order to install a selfexecuting system of private action, where leniency programs as a part of public investigation are just one of several additional tools on the side of the latter. Facing the European discussion and very different from some national experiences, the advantage of private ac- 54 See recently: Wardhaugh (Fn. 19). tion in competition law appears completely underestimated, maybe for the reason that the core fields of the law of civil procedure still are not a part of unified European law. Seen from the point of view of a full arranged legal and procedural system, such position is inadequate for the legal treatment of complex western states and societies, where the economy is ruled by the ratio of market mechanism instead of inner logics of a mushrooming bureaucracy.
V. Summary
